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Examining Wisconsin cases on the nature of a stipulation
on which a divorce judgment or order is based, the court encountered language in Estate of Boyd 5 to the effect that a
stipulation in a divorce action was in the nature of a contract.
The court held this to be an overbroad statement of the correct
8 that unless the parties
rule, laid down in Miner v. Miner,"
make a formal agreement outside of court, a stipulation is only
a joint recommendation to the court and not a contract. While
in either case the stipulation must be approved by the court,
the difference is that the formal agreement becomes a contract
which cannot be subsequently modified by the court without
the consent of the parties and any third party beneficiaries. In
Vaccaro the court held that the stipulation was a joint recommendation and that the second order was therefore valid.
MARY

F.

WYANT

INSURANCE
I.

CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS

A. "Named Insured" Clause
In Belling v. Harn,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether a separated spouse is a resident of the same
household and therefore, entitled to insurance coverage under
a "named insured" clause of an automobile liability policy.
The court found that defendant, Ruth C. Ham, was a member
of her husband's household, although at the time of the accident he was voluntarily living away from the family home following the commencement of divorce proceedings. 2 The defendant purchased the automobile in question with her own funds
after the institution of the divorce action and asked her husband to arrange for insurance. Defendant's husband simply
added the automobile to his policy which defined "named insured" to include "his spouse, if a resident of the same house65. 18 Wis. 2d 379, 118 N.W.2d 705 (1963).
66. 10 Wis. 2d 438, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960).
1. 65 Wis. 2d 108, 221 N.W.2d 888 (1974).
2. The court specifically stated that it is immaterial whether the separation is
voluntary or court-ordered. Id. at 116-17, 221 N.W.2d at 893.
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hold."3 The agent who handled this transaction was aware of
the pending divorce and, because of an earlier claim, the insurance company, Consolidated Underwriters, was aware of the
differences in addresses of the defendant and her husband.4 On
the basis of these facts, the trial court found that the defendant
was a member of the named insured's household and entitled
to coverage.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court first considered the "expectation of coverage" factor-a person obtaining
a liability insurance policy ordinarily wants and expects certain people of close relationship to also receive protection. The
"expectation of coverage" factor is simply the court's consideration of whether or not the named insured could reasonably
expect that a certain person would receive coverage under the
named insured clause. The court, quoting at length from a nine
year old decision, National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Meca,5 pointed out that the types of close relationship of these additional insureds can vary "greatly in detail."'
It would appear that there is only one essential aspect of such
a relationship: the relationship between the named insured and
the person seeking coverage as an additional insured must be
of such a nature and duration that a reasonable man would
expect that the person seeking coverage would qualify as an
additional insured. This is basically an extension of the traditional legal concept that the intention of the parties in a contractual situation is controlling. In Belling, the justices concluded as to this intention, "[i]f reasonableness of expectation
that the wife was to be covered was the sole test, there would
be no question in the case before us for here the husband secured the coverage for the wife's automobile because he was
concerned about coverage for her and the children."'
The expectations of the parties, however, cannot serve as
the sole test in light of the more recent precedent in Pamperin
v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.8 In Pamperin,the court articu3. Id. at 111, 221 N.W.2d at 890.
4. The court attached no significance to these facts, although they could be construed is notice to the insurance company of the separation of the named insured and

his wife.
5.
6.
7.
8.

26 Wis. 2d 399, 132 N.W.2d 517 (1965).
65 Wis. 2d 108, 112, 221 N.W.2d 888, 891.
Id. at 112-13, 221 N.W.2d at 891.
55 Wis. 2d 27, 197 N.W.2d 783 (1972).
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lated a three-pronged guideline to determine whether a person
is a member of a household within the context of an automobile
liability policy. The three considerations are: (1) whether the
two people (the named insured and the person seeking protection as an additional insured) are living under the same roof;
(2) whether they are living in a close, intimate, and informal
relationship; and (3) whether the intended duration of the relationship is likely to be substantial, that is, whether the relationship is one which could reasonably be expected to enter
into the considerations of parties contracting about insurance
coverage.' This third element is essentially the same as the
"expectation of coverage" factor. In Belling, the court clarified
these suggested considerations by pointing out: (1) "expectation of coverage" remains a factor to be considered; (2) the
Pamperin guidelines do not constitute a three-fold test with
each factor to be required; and (3) the first consideration,
that is, living under one roof, is neither the sole nor the controlling test of whether a person is a member of the same household.'" Having considered the "expectation of coverage" factor
and the Pamperin precedent, the court next considered the
relationship of its holding to Wisconsin divorce law.
The court reasoned that if the Wisconsin Family Code is to
retain any meaning or purpose, insurance coverage must extend to a separated spouse during the pendency of a divorce.
The statutorily-stated purpose of this code is to facilitate reconciliations by providing a mandatory cooling-off period." Furthermore, the court coupled this reasoning with the "expectation of coverage" by pointing out that logically a man would
not expect "that his removal from the family premises pending
the trial would leave his wife and children without insurance
protection."1 As an underlying reason for the decision, how9. 65 Wis. 2d 108, 113, 221 N.W.2d 888, 891.
10. Id. at 113, 221 N.W.2d at 891. The Belling court, for purposes of emphasis,
quoted the language directly from the Pamperin opinion that living under one roof is
neither the sole nor controlling test. 55 Wis. 2d at 33-34, 197 N.W.2d at 787.
11. See Wis. STAT. § 247.061(1)(a) (1973):
In every action for divorce there shall be a waiting period of 60 days after service
of the summons upon the defendant before the complaint may be served upon
him or filed in court. ...
Wis. STAT. § 247.081(1) (1973):
In every action for divorce or legal separation the family court commissioner
shall cause an effort to be made to effect a reconciliation between the parties. . ..
12. 65 Wis. 2d at 114, 221 N.W.2d at 892.
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ever, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that the Family Code expressly states that marriage is the foundation of
society. 3 To hold that an insurer could escape liability for a
separated spouse would, in the opinion of the court, hasten the
dissolution of the marriage (in effect granting a divorce before
the divorce is final) thereby seriously undermining the public
policy factors incorporated in the state's Family Code.
However, the greatest significance of Belling lies in its withdrawal of the holding in Doern v. Crawford.4 Doern, a case
involving a similar fact situation, had been remanded to determine whether the husband left the family household with the
intent not to return. As a consequence, the separation of the
spouses, and specifically the intent not to return became an
important factor considered by the court in determining residency in a family household. 5 In holding that the intent of a
spouse not to return is immaterial for the purpose of determining residency during the cooling-off period of reconciliation,' 6
any language to the contrary in Doern was overruled. Separation of the spouses (or more specifically, the intent to remain
separated) is no longer a factor to be given any weight by the
court. ,,
In terms of practice, the holding in Belling lessens the workload of the Wisconsin attorney specializing in the domestic
relations area. Following the modification of Doern, the attorney need neither speculate as to the intent of the spouse leaving
the family household nor attempt to secure new or additional
insurance coverage for either party during the pendency of the
divorce. In the future, if an insurer desires to exclude separated
spouses from coverage under the "named insured" clause, it
will be necessary to expressly state this in the policy. It is clear
from the Belling opinion that separated spouses in Wisconsin
fall within the ambit of that clause.
13. Wis. STAT. § 245.001(2) (1973) states in part:
Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society.
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society
and the state. . . . The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation
generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the
parties immediately concerned.
14. 30 Wis. 2d 206, 140 N.W.2d 193 (1966).
15. See, Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 55 Wis. 2d 27, 197 N.W.2d 783
(1972); Herbst v. Hansen, 46 Wis. 2d 697, 176 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
16. 65 Wis. 2d at 115-16, 221 N.W.2d at 892.
17. Id.
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B. "Occupying"
Moherek v. Tucker" is significant in its holding as it relates
to the coverage extended through the medical payments and
uninsured motorist provisions of many standard automobile
policies. Plaintiff, Moherek, was standing behind one car holding a spare tire against the rear bumper of that car in an attempt to protect it from the front bumper of a second car which
was about to push it. A third car driven by an uninsured driver
crashed into the rear of the second car pinning the plaintiff.
The issue was whether Moherek was "occupying" his host
driver's car within the meaning of an automobile policy which
defined "occupying" as "in or upon, entering into or alighting
from" so as to be covered by the defendant's uninsured motorist provision. 9 Recognizing that the plaintiff clearly was not
entering into or alighting from the automobile, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court narrowed the issue and focused on the proper
construction of the term "upon." 2
"Upon" in relation to "occupying" has generally been construed by the courts through application of one of two theories.' In some cases, courts have applied the physical contact
("touching") theory, that is, although not sitting in the ordinary passenger seat, the plaintiff was in some sort of physical
contact with the automobile. Alternatively, courts have applied a more liberal "use rule" which holds that coverage exists
if the injury is the direct result of the risk against which the
party is insured, that is, the use of the automobile.2 2 In applying either theory the courts have held, as in Moherek, that
"'upon" in relation to "in" and "entering into or alighting
from" is ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer. 23 Reversing the trial court, the supreme court in the case
under discussion found that the plaintiff did qualify as an occupant of the defendant's car.
18. 69 Wis. 2d 41, 230 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
19. Id. at 42, 230 N.W.2d at 149.
20. Id. at 44-45, 230 N.W.2d at 150-51.
21. See generally Pouros, Melendo, Craig, Medical Payments Provisionof the Automobile InsurancePolicy:An Illustrationof FirstPartyInsuranceProblems, 52 MARQ.
L. REV. 445 (1969).
22. The "use rule" is usually applied to named insureds and additional insureds
under that clause. See p. 356 supra.
23. 69 Wis. 2d 41, 45, 48, 230 N.W.2d 148, 151, 152; accord, Leatherman v. American Family, 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971). See also, Wolf v. American
Casualty Co., 2 III. App. 2d 124, 118 N.E.2d 777 (1954).

19761

TERM OF THE COURT

To support its decision, the court initially referred to two
cases from other jurisdictions which have construed the word
"upon." In an Illinois case, the plaintiff was held to have been
covered by a medical payments provision when he was struck
two to three feet from his auto while exchanging identification
with another driver following an accident. 4 In an Ohio case, the
plaintiff was found to have been entitled to medical payment
when he was struck while changing a tire.2 5 The Moherek court
pointed out that in both cases there was "no intent to restrict
liability to only those cases where physical contact exists." 8
Paraphrasing the Ohio holding, the court noted that "[w]hat
must be considered ... is the nature of the act engaged in at
the time and also the purpose and intent of the person injured."2 7 In other words, the plaintiff must be "vehicle oriented.""
To emphasize that physical contact is not necessary to this
"vehicle orientation," the court cited three additional cases in
which physical contact was clearly not present. In one, the
plaintiff was paying a cab fare;29 in another, he was walking
around a truck to look under the hood;3" and in the third, he
was standing away from the car while in the process of putting
chains on its tires. 31 In all of these cases, the plaintiff was held
to be sufficiently vehicle oriented so as to be "occupying" the
automobile and, thus, entitled to payment under the medical
payments and uninsured motorist provisions.
Relating these decisions to the instant case, the supreme
court noted that plaintiff "had not severed his relationship
with the vehicle by any means. 3 2 In fact, Moherek would even
have met the more stringent requirement of physical contact
inasmuch as he was holding a tire which was pressed against
the bumper of the automobile.3 3 Furthermore, "it was Mr.
24. Wolf v. American Casualty Co., 2 Ill. App. 2d 124, 118 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
25. Madden v. Automobile Ins. Co., 82 Ohio App. 111, 79 N.E.2d 586 (1948).
26. 69 Wis. 2d at 46, 230 N.W.2d at 151.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 48, 230 N.W.2d at 152.
29. Matter of Allstate Ins. v. Flauenbaum, 62 Misc. 2d 32, 308 N.Y. Supp. 2d 447
(1970)."
30. State Wide Ins. Co. v. Murdock, 25 N.Y.2d 674, 306 N.Y. Supp. 2d 678, 254
N.E.2d 908 (1969).
31. Cocking v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 965, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (1970).
32. 69 Wis. 2d at 48, 230 N.W.2d at 152.
33. Id.
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Moherek's intention to resume his position as passenger in the
vehicle and to continue on with their original planned journey. '34 Thus, in the Moherek case, both the nature of the act
engaged in and the intent and purpose of the person insured
meet the requirements of "vehicle orientation."
Two caveats are important in relation to the supreme
court's holding in Moherek. First, the issue presented in this
case arises only when the plaintiff is a person other than the
named insured or an additional insured under the named insured clause." Only persons excluded from these classifications
must meet the "occupying" requirement for coverage under the
medical payments and uninsured motorist provisions. The
named insured and additional insureds receive insurance protection under a much broader clause covering an injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of" the automobile." Secondly, the test of "vehicle orientation" enunciated by
the court in this case should not be interpreted as synonymous
with a "use rule. '37 While the court rejects any requirement of
physical contact, it does require more than simple use of the
vehicle. Specifically, there must be a consideration of the nature of the act engaged in and the intent and purpose of the
person injured before he can qualify as an "occupant" and be
entitled to coverage under the medical payments and uninsured motorist provisions.
C.

"Earth Movement"

In Wisconsin Builders, Inc. v. General Ins. Co.,"' the court
was confronted with the issue of whether the doctrine of
ejusdem generis35 should be applied to limit the meaning of
"earth movement" when that term is included in an exclusionary clause of an insurance policy. The question in the case was
whether the doctrine should be applied to limit the meaning of
"earth movement" so that it did not include forces other than
those expressly listed in the exclusionary clause, that is, earth34. Id.at 43, 230 N.W.2d at 150.
35. See p. 356-59 supra for a recent construction of coverage extended through the
"named insured" clause in Wisconsin.
36. E.g., Allstate Insurance Company Policy, Uninsured Motorist Insurance, §§
2672, 2677, 2692.
37. See p. 360 supra.
38. 65 Wis. 2d 91, 221 N.W.2d 832 (1974).
39. See generally 15 COUCH ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1966) §§ 68-70.
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quake, volcanic eruption, etc. The facts in the case centered
around the collapse of a wing of an apartment building while
it was undergoing construction." The insurance policy covering
the building project expressly excluded liability for loss
resulting from "earth movement, including but not limited to
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, earth rising or shifting." 4 ' After being instructed that
"earth movement" meant any movement of earth "whether it
be up, down or sideways," the jury found on special verdict
that the loss was caused by movement of the type excluded by
the policy. As a consequence, the defendant-insurer escaped
liability under the exclusionary clause.4"
In finding the jury instruction impermissibly broad, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff-builder's contention that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should limit the
meaning of "earth movement" to the same class of forces as
those specifically set forth in the policy. In adopting this argument, the Wisconsin court is in accord with a majority of courts
which have found this exclusion to be ambiguous and the doctrine to be applicable.4" Citing a number of Wisconsin cases,"
the court was persuaded that, while it would not bind the insurer to a risk it did not contemplate,4 5 the jury in the instant
case had been left "with too broad a class of forces excludable
under the policy."'" The ambiguity or, perhaps more accurately, the impreciseness of the language of the exclusionary
clause mandated that it be construed against the insurance
7
company which drafted the policy.
Ironically, the defendant-insurer could have escaped liabil40. The facts in this case are lengthy and complex. While there appears to be
agreement that the collapse of the wing was due to earth movement, there is conflicting
testimony as to what caused this earth movement, i.e., whether it was due to natural
forces or negligence in the excavation and construction. 65 Wis.2d at 94-98, 221 N.W.2d
at 833.
41. Id. at 94, 221 N.W.2d at 834.
42. Id. at 99, 221 N.W.2d at 836.
43. Id. at 101-02, 221 N.W.2d at 837. Seegenerally Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1972).
44. 65 Wis. 2d at 103, 221 N.W.2d at 838. Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 2d 100, 130 N.W.2d 185 (1964); Lontkowski v. Ignarski, 6 Wis.
2d 561, 95 N.W.2d 230 (1959).
45. 65 Wis. 2d at 103, 221 N.W.2d at 838.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 103, 221 N.W.2d at 838. Accord, Meiser v. Aetna Casjualty and Surety
Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233, 98 N.W.2d 919 (1959); Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis.
274, 172 N.W. 152 (1919).
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ity if he had drafted the clause to simply exclude "earth movement." By mixing the general term with more specific terms,
such as earthquake, mudflow, and volcanic eruption, the insurer paved the way for plaintiff's argument that a latent ambiguity existed and that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should
be applied. The Wisconsin court in Wisconsin Builders agreed.
H.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Wisconsin Statute Section 203.01: "Time Limitation"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court this term clarified the statutory requirement of the standard fire insurance policy that a
cause of action must be commenced within twelve months next
after inception of loss.4" In Estate of Ensz,49 although the agent
was aware that plaintiffs deceased husband was a selfemployed painter, he simply described the husband's business
on the fire insurance application as the operator of a service
station. Following a fire, the insurance company denied the
claim, because the property was not being used for a business
covered by the policy and the hazard had been increased by the
storage of large quantities of combustible material.
Two causes of action were alleged in the litigation which
followed. First, a cause of action against Brown, as agent for
the agency, for negligently and carelessly preparing the application for the fire insurance. Secondly, a cause of action against
the agent and agency for breaching an oral contract with the
deceased insured by failing to provide adequate insurance coverage. The trial court found for plaintiff holding that the agent
knew or should have known the facts of her deceased husband's
occupation at the time the policy was acquired. The defendantinsurer and agent appealed, contending that this cause of action should be barred since it was not commenced within the
statutorily prescribed twelve-month period.'"
48. Wis.

STAT.

§ 203.01 (1973):

No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have
been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after
inception of loss.
49. 66 Wis. 2d 193, 223 N.W.2d 903 (1974).
50. The fire occurred on September 6, 1970. Action was commenced by service of
a summons on June 26, 1971-within the twelve month period following the "inception
of the loss." Subsequently, however, there was an amended summons and a complaint
served, but the service of these pleadings was accomplished between October 18 and
November 19, 1971. Appellants contend that the service of the June 26 summons was
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The issue on appeal was whether the twelve-month statute
of limitations applied to a cause of action against an agent for
alleged negligence and breach of contract with the insured in
procuring the insurance coverage. The supreme court in Ensz
held that it did not, stating that the applicable statute of limitations was the six-year statute" for contract. In so holding, the
court distinguished this case trom Skrupky v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co.52 which was the basis for the defendants' contentions.
In Skrupky, the court held that "an action brought against the
insurer and its agent, whether denominated by the plaintiff as
an action for misrepresentation, fraud, breach of warranty,
negligence or mistake, still was an action on the policy subject
to the one-year limitation. '5 3 (Emphasis added).
In the case under discussion, however, the issue was not an
action brought against the liability insurer on the policy, but
against the agent on the agent's contract. Citing Wisconsin
authority, 4 the court noted that this liability is based on the
agent's contract with the insured to procure adequate insurance coverage. "The limitations of the insurance contract that
was issued are of no consequence and the applicable statute of
limitations is that for contract."55 Therefore, in Ensz, neither
the statute nor the Skrupky precedent barred plaintiff's cause
of action.
This clarification in Ensz of the statutory language and the
Skrupky precedent has practical application for the Wisconsin
insurance attorney. A cause of action which may have been
barred under the statutory twelve-month period against the
agency or which may have appeared to be barred against the
agent or agency under the Skrupky holding may be viable. It
is clear that in pleading a cause-of action against the agent for
breach of the oral contract with the insured, the attorney is
not sufficient to "commence an action" within the meaning of the statute. See, Brief
for Appellants, pp. 26-29; Brief for Respondents, pp. 15-20. The court's opinion did not
deal with this argument, since the court found the six-year, rather than the one-year,
statute of limitations to be controlling in the instant case.
51. Wis. STAT. § 893.19(3) (1973):
An action upon any other contract, obligation or liability, express or implied,
except those mentioned in ss. 893.16 and 893.18.
52. 55 Wis. 2d 636, 201 N.W.2d 49 (1972).
53. 66 Wis. 2d at 198-99, 223 N.W.2d at 907.
54. Journal Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 188 Wis. 140, 205
N.W. 800 (1925); Stadler v. Trever, 86 Wis. 42, 56 N.W. 187 (1893).
55. 66 Wis. 2d at 199, 223 N.W.2d at 907.
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working within the six-year statute of limitations for contract
actions and not within the twelve-month statutory period allowed for an action on the policy.
B.

Wisconsin Statute Section 631.36(2): "Notice"

In Petersonv. Truck Ins. Exchange,56 the court encountered
another problem of statutory interpretation. Wisconsin Statute
section 631.36(2) covers cancellation by the insurer "prior to
the expiration of the agreed term."5 Until this term, the court
had not confronted the problem of the effect of this statute on
a clause in an insurance policy which provided for automatic
lapse at the end of the month for which payment has been
made, if the premium for the next month has not been paid.
The Petersoncase presented the court with the issue of whether
the insurer was required to give the statutorily-prescribed tenday notice to the insured of cancellation of coverage for nonpayment of premium. The court held that there was no obligation under the statute to give such a notice to the insured.
In reaching this decision, the court noted that "the statute
requires notice only in the case of 'cancellation' and not in the
case of 'lapse'."58 This holding is based on the distinction between cancellation and termination. 9 While a policy is "cancelled" by a termination prior to the end of the policy period,
it is "terminated" by the expiration of the policy by lapse of
the policy period." In recognizing this distinction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is in accord with other jurisdictions which
"have held that suspension of coverage during a period of
56. 65 Wis. 2d 542, 223 N.W.2d 579 (1974).
57. Wis. STAT. § 631.36(2)(a) (1973):
MIDTERM CANCELLATION. (a) Permissible grounds. No insurance policy that
has been in effect for at least 70 days or that has been renewed may be canceled
by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed term or one year from the
effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever is less, except on any one of
the following grounds:
1. Failure to pay a premium when due ...
58. 65 Wis. 2d at 553, 223 N.W.2d at 585.
59. See generally Ghiardi, Wienke, Recent Developments in the Cancellation,
Renewal, and Rescission of Automobile Insurance Policies, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 219
(1968). See also Whitford, Kimball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A Case
Study of the Office of the Commissioner of Insuranceof Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REv.
639, 688-91.
60. 65 Wis. 2d at 552-53, 223 N.W.2d at 584. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Security Fire and Indemnity Co., 248 S.C. 307, 149 S.E.2d 647; Waynesville
Security Bank v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 499 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. App. 1973).
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premium or assessment default was not a cancellationand was
not covered by statutes requiring notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium."'" (Emphasis added).
III.

UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

In Collicott v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,62 the court
clarified some aspects of Wisconsin's uninsured motorist coverage. Briefly, plaintiffs were parents of a child injured in an
automobile accident with an uninsured driver. The child eventually died as a result of these injuries. Defendant-insurer had
issued plaintiffs a policy in which it agreed to pay up to $15,000
for injury or death of the child which resulted from an accident
with an uninsured driver. Upon plaintiffs' subsequent claim,
defendant refused to pay or to arbitrate according to the provisions of the policy, claiming that two other drivers were involved in the accident and were causally negligent. Both of
these drivers had valid, collectible, and enforceable policies of
automobile liability insurance with minimum limits at least
equivalent to the $15,000 limit then effective by statute.
Defendant-insurer contended, therefore, that uninsured motorist insurance did not apply and that the action could not be
maintained because plaintiff had failed to resort to arbitration
before commencement of his suit. Rejecting both of these contentions, the trial court held that arbitration had been waived,
and the plaintiffs were not required to establish the absence of
other collectible sources before qualifying for uninsured motor3
ist coverage.1
61. 65 Wis. 2d at 553; 223 N.W.2d at 585. Eghotz v. Creech, 365 Mich. 527, 113
N.W.2d 815 (1962); Early v. Bremer County Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Assoc., 201 Iowa
263, 207 N.W. 117 (1926).
62. 68 Wis. 2d 115, 227 N.W.2d 668 (1974).
63. Wisconsin's uninsured motorist statute is § 204.30(5) (1973):
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE.

(a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle

liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed
by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto in limits for bodily injury or death in the amount of at least $15,000 per
person and $30,000 per accident under provisions approved by the commissioner
of insurance, for the protection of persons injured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom. The uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage limits provided in an
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Affirming the trial court, the supreme court initially determined whether arbitration was a condition precedent to suit
under the provisions of the uninsured motorist coverage of the
insurance policy and the state statute. Noting that under both
the policy and the statute either party could invoke the arbitration procedure as a matter of right, the court concluded that
arbitration was not required prior to commencement of suit.
Although the court did examine the language of the statute 4
and of the policy,65 this holding is an affirmance of the precedautomobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance may be made
available to the insured up to the bodily injury coverage limits provided in the
remaining portions of the policy. The uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage
limits provided in an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of
insurance as required in this subsection shall not be reduced by the terms
thereof to provide the insured with less protection than would be afforded him
if he were injured by a motorist insured under an automobile liability or motor
vehicle liability policy of insurance containing the limits provided in this
subsection.
(b) For purposes of this coverage, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes an
insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the
motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction. In such
case, the insurer making payment under the uninsured motorists' coverage
shall, to the extent of the payment, be subrogated to the rights of its insured.
This extension of coverage shall apply only with respect to accidents occurring
after July 1, 1966.
See generally Uninsured Motorist Coverage-New Developments, Problems and
Opportunities, 45 Wis. BAR BULL. 47 (1972).
64. Wisconsin Arbitration Act §§ 1, 2, Wis. STAT. §§ 298.01, .02 (1973):
298.01 ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE. A provision in any written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any
controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, shall
be valid, irrevocable and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract; provided, however, that the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to contracts between employers and employes, or between employers and associations of employes, except as provided
in section 111.10 of the statutes.

298.02

STAY OF ACTION TO PERMIT ARBITRATION.

If any suit or proceeding be

brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
65. 68 Wis. 2d at 119, 227 N.W.2d at 670:
If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that
such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of
an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree
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ent in Schramm v. Dotz5 which stated that, "[b]y providing
for a stay pending arbitration, the statute implicitly denies the
validity of a provision that no action may be brought until
arbitration has been had and the dismissal which defendant
consistently sought at every stage of the action.""7
After this initial determination, the court then examined
defendant's contention that the uninsured motorist coverage
was not applicable where other insured tortfeasors are involved. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tomanski,5 an Ohio case,
was "directly on point,"69 holding that the "right to recovery
under the contract is not eliminated by the presence of an
insured motor vehicle in the same accident."" The important
distinction, and a distinction which has been recognized by the
Wisconsin court," is that "recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement is on the contract, not in tort. 7 2 In addition,

a Wisconsin case, Morateck v. Milwaukee Auto Mut. Ins. Co. ,
and the language of the trust agreement in the uninsured motorist endorsement 4 would support the court's decision that it
is not necessary to first sue all other potentially liable tortfeasors.
The court concluded that if it accepted defendant's contention two results would occur: first, plaintiffs could be compelled to verify a complaint containing allegations of negligence against parties they believed were not negligent in any
respect and, second, they could be exposed to attorney's fees
and statutory costs in the event of a judgment of no liability.
as to the amount payable hereunder, then each party shall, upon written demand of either, select a competent and disinterested arbitrator. The two arbitrators so named shall select a third arbitrator, or if unable to agree thereon within
30 days, then upon request of the insured or the company such third arbitrator
shall be selected by a judge of a court of record in the county and state in which
such arbitration is pending. The arbitrators shall then hear and determine the
question or questions so in dispute, and the decision in writing of any two arbitrators shall be binding upon the insured and the company ...
66. 23 Wis. 2d 678, 127 N.W.2d 779 (1964).
67. Id. at 682, 127 N.W.2d at 781.
68. 27 Ohio St. 2d 222, 271 N.E.2d 924 (1971).
69. 68 Wis. 2d at 121, 227 N.W.2d at 671.
70. 27 Ohio St. 2d at 117, 271 N.E.2d at 927.
71. Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 64, 70, 171 N.W.2d
914, 917, 918 (1969).
72. 68 Wis. 2d at 121, 227 N.W.2d at 671.
73. 34 Wis. 2d 95, 148 N.W.2d 704 (1967). See Comment, Arbitration: Uninsured
Motorist Endorsement, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 411, 432 (1970).
74. 68 Wis. 2d at 122, 227 N.W.2d at 671.

The court in Collicott, however, did not resolve the more important question of precisely what is an uninsured driver or,
more specifically, whether an underinsureddriver is an uninsured driver as to an unsatisfied claim. These questions remain
open for future resolution by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
EVA M. SOEKA

LABOR LAW
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Association v. Milwaukee County,' addressed the issue of
whether, after a petition for final and binding arbitration has
been filed pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 111.77(4)(b),
a party to the negotiations may amend its final offer to include
a proposal not previously subject to the negotiation process.
The Association and the County were in the process of negotiating a contract for 1973 when the association filed with the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) for
binding arbitration under section 111.77(4)(b), alleging that an
impasse had been reached. WERC appointed an officer who
held two meetings with the parties. Thereafter the County
modified its "final offer," by incorporating a proposal for a two,
rather than a one year contract. The matter of a two year
contract had not been mentioned during the negotiations before the petition for binding arbitration was filed. When WERC
directed the parties to submit their final offers, the County
submitted its amended final proposal, and the County's package, with the two year contract, was eventually accepted.
The trial court overturned the arbitrator's decision, and the
supreme court affirmed. The court held that to allow an arbitrator to consider issues raised for the first time in binding
arbitration would be contrary to the purpose behind binding,
compulsory arbitration which is to resolve negotiable differences by narrowing the issues to be resolved. The court determined that for binding arbitration to be effective, no new matters presented for the first time after the filing of a petition for
arbitration shall be accepted as it "flies directly into the teeth
of the statute."'2 The court also pointed out that to allow such
1. 64 Wis. 2d 651, 221 N.W.2d 673 (1974).
2. Id. at 658, 221 N.W.2d at 676.

